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JUDICIALLY SANCTIONED ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE:
MAKING THE CASE FOR MEDICAL
MONITORING
Logan Glasenapp*

ABSTRACT
Across the United States, families are getting ready to start their
day. The kids are waking up and brushing their teeth, the toast is
being buttered, and the newspaper is being retrieved from the
curb. However, in some communities this scene is playing out
against the backdrop of a toxic legacy dating back to the American
industrial revolution. In the South Valley of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, families are waking up to the smell of gasoline and the
sound of idling trains. Around the harbor in New Bedford,
Massachusetts, families are unable to sit down to a locallysourced seafood dinner. And in Rockford, Michigan, families are
driving to Wal-Mart to purchase yet another case of bottled water
because their wells are still unusable. Any of these families,
however, wishing to receive regular medical screenings for
diseases caused by exposure to toxic or hazardous substances will
need to pay for those screenings themselves. Despite a wellarticulated and enforced “polluter pays principle,” the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) does not provide private recovery for
preventive medical care. This article explores the federal judicial
decisions that have deprived communities of an ability to protect
themselves from the long-term, often latent, health effects of toxic
exposure; provides a broad survey of various state common law
approaches; and suggests possible avenues to address this
problem without fundamentally changing the regulatory or
enforcement scheme of CERCLA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Joel Stelt died on March 26, 2016, at the age of 61 of liver cancer.1 Joel’s
wife, Sandy Wynn-Stelt, received visitors from the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality seventeen months later informing her that a nearby hazardous
waste dump had contaminated her groundwater with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid
(PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).2 At the time, Ms. Wynn-Stelt’s
groundwater well was contaminated with 37,800 parts-per-trillion of a combination
of PFOS and PFOA, or 540 times what the United States Environmental Protection
Agency advises as safe.3 Another neighbor of the Wolverine site recently took her 5year old daughter to get a blood test, with the results coming back negative for
PFOA/PFOS.4 But she said “That’s today. Do we have to do this once a year from
now on? Do we wait five years? How long until we can be comfortable with, ‘OK,
they are free and clear.’ The question will forever be in our heads.”5 To be fair, the
company did provide most families with at least a case of bottled water and gift cards
to a local grocery store.6 Another neighbor of the Wolverine site was worried for her
son, wondering if, “[i]n 30 years, when my son has hypertension . . . every disease
under the sun because of this,” Wolverine will pay for his healthcare.7
The residents of this Michigan community will likely bring legal action
against Wolverine for its role in contaminating their wells. This legal action could
take the form of a cost recovery action under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 8 Chapter 7 of the Michigan
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act,9 or state common-law.
Unfortunately for these residents, CERCLA has been traditionally interpreted to bar
medical monitoring as a necessary cost of recovery10 and their state courts do not
recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action absent a present physical injury.11
Concededly, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has historically

* Logan Glasenapp graduated from the University of New Mexico School of Law in May 2018 and
works for the state. He would like to thank Professor Cliff Villa for his tireless work on this article and
his endless support as a friend and mentor. He would also like to thank his family for their ceaseless
support throughout his career, his friends for their unwavering patience, and of course Sammy and Zelly
for the many breaks they demanded I take from the work.
1. Garret Ellison, Cancer, thyroid problems plague Wolverine dump neighbors, GRAND RAPID
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2017/10/house_street_dump_
neighbors.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
9. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.20101–324.20142 (2017).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Mich. 2005).
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funded pilot medical monitoring programs.12 However, these programs are funded
through state taxes and not by the responsible polluters.13
This article provides the history of environmental injustice created by both
legislative and judicial inaction in remedying the toxic footprint of our country’s
industrial past, present, and future. Part II provides a broad-strokes background of
CERCLA, detailing the poor draftsmanship and narrow interpretation of CERCLA’s
“necessary costs of response” provision. Part III provides a general background of
medical monitoring within the hazardous and toxic substance exposure context to
introduce the judicial and legislative chasm in hazardous and toxic waste law.14 Part
IV provides an analysis of court opinions whose narrow interpretations of CERCLA
have resulted in denying medical monitoring damages to plaintiffs exposed to toxic
or hazardous substances. Part V, in turn, analyzes various state common law tort
actions that have largely failed to provide adequate remedies to victims of toxic and
hazardous exposure, due either to narrow interpretation or the creation of
insurmountable burdens of proof for claims for medical monitoring. Finally, Part VI
provides a solution to these issues: CERCLA’s polluter pays principle must be
broadened by Congressional action to include costs of medical monitoring for
communities exposed to toxic and hazardous substances.
II. CERCLA BACKGROUND
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, familiarly known as CERCLA, was passed in 1980. Notably, CERCLA has a
certain notoriety among courts and litigants for being so poorly drafted as to require
courts to often supply their own definitions.15 In the waning days of the Carter
administration, Congress rushed to get a waste cleanup bill to the president’s desk.16
The original Senate bill 1480 contained language providing for recovery of medical
costs and damage to personal property.17 To the chagrin of future medical monitoring
plaintiffs, this language was ultimately removed through the Randolph-Stafford
amendment that allowed the bill to pass the Senate.18 The passage of the RandolphStafford amendment led Senator Randolph to reflect, “[w]e have deleted the federal
12. Id. at 699–701.
13. Id. at 714 (dissenting opinion).
14. This topic was heavily discussed following the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA) and the subsequent attempts at damages claims have, since the mid-1990s, fallen mostly
silent.
15. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle Cty., 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting
and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage. Problems of interpretation have arisen
from the Act’s use of inadequately defined terms, a difficulty particularly apparent in the response costs
area.”)
16. Id.
17. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY DIVISION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., FOR THE S. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1983) (Hereafter CERCLA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY), 168–70.
18. See J.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 517, 530 (1992).
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cause of action for medical expenses or property or income loss.”19 As will be
remembered ad nauseam throughout this article, this seemingly innocent reflection
from Senator Randolph is one of the pillars of judicial interpretation finding that
medical monitoring is not a “necessary cost of response” under CERCLA.20
Congress passed CERCLA largely in response to the disaster at Love Canal,
New York, which caused 240 families to abandon their homes after finding toxic and
hazardous sludge seeping into their basements.21 The story of Love Canal is most
likely familiar to anyone reading this article,22 and it is considered within the ranks
of notorious environmental disasters like Chernobyl, Bhopal, and Deepwater
Horizon.23 Realizing the complete lack of response authority and liability under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Congress sprang into action to pass what
we know today as CERCLA, or the Superfund law.24
CERCLA has an incredibly broad reach of liability. The statute imposes
strict liability, joint and several liability, and retroactive liability.25 CERCLA, in its
simplest form, can be boiled down to a single principle: “polluter pays.”26 CERCLA
created rights of action for the federal government, state governments, tribal
governments and private citizens for cost recovery actions and for potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) for either cost recovery or contribution actions.27 This
polluter pays concept rings true through most of the regulatory scheme of CERCLA
and in its application over the past three decades. Conversely, it falls flat within the
realm of community-wide medical monitoring. With very limited exceptions, private
citizens exposed to toxic or hazardous substances do not have the ability to make the
polluter pay for medical monitoring programs.28
Section 107 of CERCLA establishes the well-known categories of PRPs:
(1) owner and operator;29 (2) former owner and operator;30 (3) arranger;31 and (4)
transporter.32 All four of these categories are liable for “all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States,” or—and most importantly for this

19. Statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, 126 Cong. Rel. S14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980);
CERCLA Legislative History, supra note 17, at 681, 685.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Colin Crawford, Medical Monitoring and the Future of CERCLA: Reinvigorating the Superfund
Law’s Consequentialist Purpose, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 839, 845 (1996).
22. For those not familiar with the story, the author suggests LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL:
AND THE BIRTH OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT (updated ed. 2011).
23. Id. at 1.
24. See generally Maloney, supra note 18.
25. See id. at 536–542.
26. Thomas J. Braun, Cleaning up the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 58 FED. LAW. 54, 54 (2011).
27. Ronald G. Aronovsky, Foreward: CERCLA and the Future of Liability-Based Environmental
Regulation, 41 SW. L. REV. 581, 582–83 (2012).
28. See infra Parts IV (a vast majority of courts have found that medical monitoring is not recoverable
under CERCLA) and V (some state courts have allowed medical monitoring claims to proceed either as
a separate cause of action in tort or as a remedy to negligence).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2012).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2012).
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article—”any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.”33 Congress did not define “necessary
costs of response,” however, thereby requiring courts to supply their own
definition.34
III. MEDICAL MONITORING
It is important at this juncture to provide a definition of and limitation to
“medical monitoring.” Following the lead of the Brewer court, discussed below, this
article views medical monitoring as a community-wide program used to early
diagnose diseases caused by exposure to hazardous or toxic substances.35 Medical
monitoring does not mean individual medical treatment for diseases which have
already manifested. Further, medical monitoring is similar to, but quite distinct from
medical screening or medical surveillance.36 A common thread running through the
state court opinions is the issue that diseases caused by exposure to toxic or
hazardous substances often have long latency periods and plaintiffs risk running
afoul of statutes of limitations or the single-action doctrine if they wait for
manifestation of injuries.37 Statutes of limitations and the single-action doctrine
illustrate just how complex this question is and why it has been a difficult question
to answer for many courts. By narrowly defining medical monitoring to communitywide programs designed to detect diseases earlier but not to provide for treatment of
those diseases, this article avoids the issue of having the term confused for “personal
medical expenses,” which are clearly not included in CERCLA liability.38
To fall within the definition of “necessary costs of response,” medical
monitoring would be available only to communities directly exposed to hazardous
or toxic substances. These communities could be within the vicinity of a site on the
National Priorities List (NPL), or meet the requirements of “any other person” under
CERCLA Section 107.39 These communities, however, would receive the benefits
of diagnosing a disease like asbestosis, mesothelioma, or any variety of cancers
linked to hazardous substances.40 Longer life expectancy, increased likelihood of
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C)–(D) (2012) (PRPs are
also liable for natural resources damages and any costs incurred by the ATSDR in conducting health
assessments or a health effects study).
34. See generally Joel W. Reese & Michael C. Wright, Defining “Necessary Costs of Response”
under CERCLA, 29 ST. B. TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 113 (1999).
35. See David Vearrier & Michael I. Greenberg, The implementation of medical monitoring programs
following potentially hazardous exposures: a medico-legal perspective, 55 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 956,
957 (2017) (defining medical monitoring as “periodic medical testing to screen people at significant risk
for disease.”).
36. Id. (“Medical monitoring is distinguished from medical screening and medical surveillance in its
intent. Medical monitoring aims to identify indicia of disease in a population at significantly increased
risk of disease due to a past exposure so as to benefit the individual being screened.” (emphasis added)).
37. See infra Part V.
38. This term will become nauseatingly familiar throughout this article, as it has plagued medical
monitoring claimants for decades.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2012).
40. See, e.g., Rachel M. Ostroff, et al., Early Detection of Malignant Pleural Mesothelioma in
Asbestos-Exposed Individuals with a Noninvasive Proteomics-Based Surveillance Tool, 7 PLOS ONE 1
(2012); Heidi C. Roberts, et al., Screening for Malignant Pleural Mesothelioma and Lung Cancer in
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recovery, higher qualities of life, mental and emotional health security, the list of
benefits goes on.41
A common complaint lodged against medical monitoring is that it would be
unfair to defendants to force them to pay for medical monitoring for everyone
exposed to these substances, because they would have undoubtedly provided
monitoring to a person who maybe would have never developed the disease.42 This
complaint carries some of the classic complaints against CERCLA, that it is an unfair
statute on the regulated community.43 Some courts have found this a convincing
policy argument and have thus corrupted and will continue to corrupt the original
intent of CERCLA. CERCLA was enacted in response to an environmental and
public health catastrophe unseen in modern United States history and was enacted
with the goals of protecting the public health as well as the environment through the
“polluter pays” principle.44 As a remediation statute, it should be constructed broadly
but courts have instead erected obstacles to recovery based on protecting PRPs with
possibly clean hands.45 The “polluter pays” principle stands anathema to this judicial
philosophy and should be wielded as a tool to recover the costs of medical
monitoring, regardless of the ultimate health outcomes of those exposed to hazardous
or toxic substances.
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING UNDER CERCLA
Pursuant to CERCLA, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) may provide medical monitoring to communities “in cases of
public health emergencies caused or believed to be caused by exposure to toxic
substances.”46 The inclusion of this discretionary function of the ATSDR has led
most courts, when faced with the question, to determine that medical monitoring is
not a “necessary cost of response.”47 The ATSDR, however, does not have a very
Individuals with a History of Asbestos Exposure, 4 J. OF THORACIC ONCOLOGY 620 (2009); see also
Mesothelioma
Life
Expectancy
and
Early
Detection,
MESOTHELIOMAHELP.ORG,
https://www.mesotheliomahelp.org/mesothelioma/prognosis/life-expectancy/ (last visited Nov. 11,
2018).
41. See, e.g., Bernard Levin, et al., Screening and Surveillance for the Early Detection of Colorectal
Cancer and Adenomatous Polyps, 2008: A Joint Guideline from the American Cancer Society, the US
Multi-Society Task Force on Colorectal Cancer, and the American College of Radiology, 134
GASTROENTEROLOGY 1570 (2008); Monika Nothacker, et al., Early detection of breast cancer: benefits
and risks of supplemental breast ultrasound in asymptomatic women with mammographically dense
breast tissue. A systemic review., BMC CANCER 2009, 9:335, (Sept. 20, 2009) at 1–2; see also Richard
Mayeux, Biomarkers: Potential Uses and Limitations, 1 NEURORX: THE J. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 182 (2004).
42. See infra Part V.
43. See Crawford, supra note 21.
44. Carmen E. Sessions, Medical Monitoring Awards Under CERCLA: Statutory Interpretation
Versus Fundamental Fairness, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 81 (1999).
45. See infra Part V.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1)(D) (2017).
47. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.
Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12548 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988) (“Certainly, when Congress wanted to provide for medical care
and testing, it knew how to do so in explicit language.”).
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long history of providing medical monitoring for communities. The criteria used by
ATSDR to determine if medical monitoring is warranted was first published in the
Federal Register in 1995, probably in response to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation
emergency in Washington state.48 ATSDR’s determination mechanism has two
phases, with seven criteria total.49 The availability of medical monitoring under
CERCLA Section 104 leads to one of two conclusions for courts. First, Congress
knew what it was doing when it left medical expenses out of Section 107.50 Second,
the policy argument laid out by many plaintiffs for medical monitoring response
costs is misplaced because they could be seeking medical monitoring from the
ATSDR.51
The consensus among courts that have addressed the question of whether
medical monitoring is a “necessary cost of response” under CERCLA is that these
costs are not recoverable.52 While most of the cases reaching this conclusion are from
federal district courts, the Tenth Circuit put a proverbial lid on CERCLA medical
monitoring claims in 1992 with its decision in Daigle.53 There are a number of
decisions on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment that have allowed
claims for medical monitoring to proceed without reaching a conclusion on the
merits.54 One federal court has held that costs of medical monitoring may be
recoverable under CERCLA, and it is one of the earliest cases in the line that has

48. ATSDR’s Final Criteria for Determining the Appropriateness of a Medical Monitoring Program
Under CERCLA, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,840 (Jul. 28, 1995) [hereinafter ATSDR’s Final Criteria]. The ATSDR,
two years later, released its final decision to create a medical monitoring program for the community
around the Hanford site. Press Release Announcement of ATSDR’s Decision on Medical Monitoring for
Hanford,
CENTERS
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/radiat1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
49. ATSDR’s Final Criteria, supra note 48. (Phase 1: (1) documented exposure; (2) “well-defined,
identifiable target population;” and (3) documented human health research showing association between
an exposure and a specific adverse health effect. Phase 2: (4) monitoring should be directed at detecting
adverse health effects that are consistent with scientific and medical knowledge; (5) “general requirements
for a medical screening program should be satisfied;” (6) a treatment program must exist; and (7) “[t]he
logistics of the system must be resolved before the program can be initiated.”).
50. Coburn, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548 at *12–13.
51. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536–37.
52. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992); Price v. United States Navy,
818 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. Cal. 1992); Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp.
887 (D. Minn. 1990) vacated on other grounds, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Ambrogi v. Gould,
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989);
Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988);
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
53. 972 F.2d 1527. There have been no real CERCLA medical monitoring claims brought since 1992,
and a distinct trend towards plaintiffs seeking medical monitoring cost recovery through state common
law actions.
54. See Williams v. Allied Automotive Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
that costs of medical monitoring not categorically unrecoverable as long as plaintiff’s meet the burden of
proving such costs are necessary and consistent with the NCP); Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
No. 85-508, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3609 (E.D. Kan. Feb. 29, 1988) (denying motion to dismiss medical
monitoring CERLCA claims); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Tenn. 1985)
(denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (denying motion to dismiss CERCLA medical monitoring claims).
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created the ultimate general rule of refusing recovery for medical monitoring.55 The
beginning of CERCLA medical monitoring case law feinted a bright future for
communities exposed to toxic and hazardous substances, but that idea was quickly
squelched by the deluge of cases refusing to grant medical monitoring cost recovery.
For all intents and purposes, CERCLA medical monitoring cost recovery has been a
fruitless venture since 1992.
A.

Chaplin v. Exxon Corporation

The earliest case facing the question of medical monitoring cost recovery
came out of the Southern Texas District Court in 1986.56 While not providing a rich
analysis for the purposes of a journal article, this case inspired the court in Coburn
(discussed below), which led to an overwhelming majority of courts finding that
medical monitoring costs are not recoverable under CERCLA. In Chaplin, a
purported class of plaintiffs brought suit against a list of corporate defendants.57 The
defendants generated or transported toxic substances to a number of waste sites in
the eastern half of Harris County, Texas.58 In quick succession and with little
discussion, the court reasoned that: (1) early drafts of CERCLA contained a cause of
action for medical expenses, but the enacted law did not; (2) Congress created
medical cost recovery by creating the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry; and (3) plaintiffs have not actually incurred any costs to even submit that
evidence for recovery.59 Following this reasoning, the court granted defendants’
motion to dismiss the CERCLA claims, holding that the statute did not contain a
cause of action for medical monitoring cost recovery.60
A cornerstone of the analysis in this case, and a theme that is consistent
among courts rejecting medical monitoring cost recovery claims, is a short quote
from the legislative history from former Senator Jennings Randolph.61 The quote
simply says, “[w]e have deleted the federal cause of action for medical expenses or
property or income loss.”62
B.

Brewer v. Ravan

This case did not find former Senator Randolph’s quote as evidence of a
categorical bar to medical monitoring cost recovery, but as a limitation and standard
setting statement for plaintiffs in the future seeking medical monitoring. The Brewer
court’s careful analysis and detailed interpretation has not been followed by many
courts, but readers may find it the most humanely compelling interpretation of
Section 107.
Former employees of a capacitor manufacturing plant in Waynesboro,
Tennessee, brought suit against the current and former owners of the property as well
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
Chaplin v. Exxon Co., No. H-84-2524, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24438 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1986).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4–12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *5–6.
126 CONG. REC. S14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
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as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).63 The manufacturing
plant is now the Mallory Capacitor Superfund Site.64 According to the site’s
information page, groundwater is contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), trans-1, 2-dichloroethylene, and trichloroethylene (TCE).65 Plaintiffs
brought suit alleging violations of CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA).66 Invoking CERCLA Sections 107(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2)(B), plaintiffs sought
to recover the costs of a medical monitoring program to facilitate early diagnosis of
diseases caused by exposure to PCBs and other toxic substances.67 Defendants,
arguing that plaintiffs had not incurred any recoverable response costs under the
statute, moved to dismiss the CERCLA claims.68
In his opinion, Chief Judge Wiseman, Jr., took an approach that arguably
led to the ultimate rejection of CERCLA medical monitoring claims. By parsing the
words of CERCLA, the opinion found that there are different standards for
monitoring of soil or groundwater for contamination, community-wide medical
monitoring with an eye to public health and welfare, and private individualized
medical care.69 Although this approach was novel and should have led to more
openness for medical monitoring claims, it had the reverse effect of raising the bar
for pleadings and ultimately closed the door on recovery at all. The heart of this
opinion is the discussion of the differences between medical expenses and medical
monitoring. Holding that costs “to assess the effect of the release or discharge on
public health or to identify potential health problems presented by the release” are
recoverable under CERCLA whereas costs “in the treatment of personal injuries or
disease” are not, the court created its own definition of “necessary costs of
response.”70 The court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they
sought civil or injunctive relief,71 but held as cognizable claims those seeking
recovery for necessary costs of response related to assessing the effect of the release
on public health or to identify potential health problems.72
The lack of a clear definition of this phrase is by far the largest obstacle for
plaintiffs seeking CERCLA medical monitoring costs. Until Congress amends
CERCLA to clarify its intent, plaintiffs will continue to be plagued by shoddy
draftsmanship in a rushed piece of legislation.73 The Brewer court seemed to
63. Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
64. See Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int’l, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (This is a cost
recovery action under CERCLA brought by Emhart as the current owners against Duracell as the former
owner. Mallory Capacitor Co. was a subsidiary of Duracell at the time of Duracell’s ownership.).
65. Mallory
Capacitor
Co.
Waynesboro,
TN
Contaminant
List,
EPA,
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=second.contams&id=0403783 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018).
66. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178.
67. Id. at 1178–79.
68. Id. at 1178.
69. Id. at 1178–1180.
70. Id. at 1179.
71. Id. at 1180.
72. Id. at 1179–80.
73. See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is
not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous
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approach this question with a sense of humanity and compassion for victims of
hazardous and toxic pollution and used Congressional vagueness to find in favor of
sound medical science.74 The trend in this realm, since the Brewer decision, has been
to see Congressional vagueness and an off-hand quote from former Senator Jennings
Randolph as evidence that Congress did not intend to allow medical monitoring cost
recovery under CERCLA.
Because of the next two cases discussed, plaintiffs have been forced to seek
medical monitoring through the ultra-expensive, litigious, contentious, and drawn
out claim processes of toxic torts. This had led to an imbalance between clearly
negligent or intentional polluters and the innocent victims living in the immediate
areas around these toxic sites. The way to balance the scales in instances of toxic or
hazardous substance exposure is to amend CERCLA to allow medical monitoring
cost recovery, but with the gridlock in Washington it seems like the most farfetched
possibility raised in this article.
C.

Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corporation

This class action consisted of “all persons who were exposed to well water
contaminated with TCE and other hazardous substances” released by defendants’
actions.75 Along with a CERCLA claim for medical monitoring, the plaintiffs sought
groundwater well monitoring under CERCLA.76 Following the arc of the legislative
history and balancing policy arguments, the court ultimately rejected the claim for
medical monitoring but allowed the claim for groundwater monitoring to carry on.77
The court stated its task on this question succinctly: “whether costs of medical
screening and/or future medical monitoring constitute ‘necessary costs of response’
under CERCLA.”78
The court acknowledged that “necessary costs of response” is not a defined
term in the statute.79 The court then underwent the kind of definitional chain-making
and gymnastics for which CERCLA is notorious.80 “Response” is defined as
“remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action.”81 “Remove” and “remedy” are
both defined in Section 101, as well.82 Remedies tend to be thought of as long-term
solutions to address the drawn out impacts of hazardous or toxic pollution, whereas
removals tend to be thought of as immediate actions taken to stop, slow, or contain
the spread of pollution.83 The concept of medical monitoring, logically, seems to
ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage. Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act’s
use of inadequately defined terms, a difficulty particularly apparent in the response costs area.”).
74. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
75. Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1 (E.D. Penn.
Nov. 9, 1988).
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. at *38.
78. Id. at *6.
79. Id.
80. See id. at *6–7.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (2012).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) (2012).
83. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (E.D. Pa. 1988); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985).
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indicate a long-term solution to address the drawn out impacts of pollution. Despite
this, courts have traditionally analyzed CERCLA to determine if medical monitoring
costs should be considered within the definition of “remove” or “removal action,”
rather than the definition of “remedy” or “remedial action.”84 The Coburn court did
not reach this step in its analysis, opting to rely on the analysis of Chaplin.85
Following the example set in Chaplin, the court looked to the legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended medical monitoring costs to be
considered a “necessary costs of response.”86 The court explained that previous
drafts of CERCLA contained provisions for medical cost recovery, but at the
eleventh hour of debate those provisions were scrapped in order to strike a
compromise and pass the bill.87 This intentional deletion of medical cost recovery
provisions, according to the court, showed that Congress did not intend for medical
costs to be recoverable.88 Following the interpretation of previous courts, and setting
the foundation for the most common reasoning of future courts, this court leaned
heavily upon one specific line in the legislative history to reach its holding that
medical monitoring costs are not recoverable under CERLCA:89 “[w]e have deleted
the federal cause of action for medical expenses or property or income loss.”90 This
statement has plagued medical monitoring plaintiffs for almost three decades, and
will continue to plague them until Congress provides clarity to CERCLA.
Interestingly, the Coburn court recognized that resting wholly upon that
statement from the legislative history was an unpersuasive position in light of the
Brewer court’s precise analysis.91 The Coburn court found Chaplin more persuasive,
ultimately, because of its definitional chain making which concluded that CERCLA
contemplates only the removal of toxic substances from the environment not from
the population.92 Because the only possible language that could signal monitoring
cost recovery is contained within the definition of “remove,” and the larger statutory
scheme is for removing toxic substances from the environment, any monitoring
contemplated by the definition of “remove” must be for things like soil or
groundwater monitoring.93 Finally, Coburn followed one more precedent that comes
up often in CERCLA medical monitoring cases, the creation of the ATSDR in
SARA.94 Congress considered medical cost recovery under the statutory scheme and
put it within the authorities of ATSDR, not as a cause of action under Section 107,
according to the court.95 This case has produced a meager progeny which has found

84. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp.
1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
85. Coburn, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *11.
86. Id. at *9.
87. Id. at *8.
88. Id. at *17–18.
89. Id. at *18.
90. 126 Cong. Rec. 30932 (statement of Sen. Randolph).
91. See Coburn, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *14–16.
92. Id. at *16.
93. See Id. at *17.
94. See id. at *12 (citing Chaplin v. Exxon Co., No. H-84-2524, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24438, at
*8–9 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1986)).
95. Id.
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it sufficient to merely say “[r]ather than add unnecessarily to the length of this
[m]emorandum, the court will simply adopt the rationale of the Coburn court as its
own.”96
D.

Daigle v. Shell Oil Company

For those familiar with the CERCLA Hall of Fame, the legacy of the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal is a well-known story. The Arsenal was operated by the United
States Army for decades to manufacture chemical agents, products, and incendiary
munitions.97 This case concerned the Army’s use of Basin F as a hazardous waste
surface impoundment.98 Shell Oil also used Basin F to impound residual waste from
its production of herbicides and pesticides.99 The toxic legacy at the Arsenal has been
well-documented and litigated.100 Unlike other litigation concerning the Arsenal, this
case was not a dispute over CERCLA liability or responsibility of potential parties,
it was a dispute over the airborne odors and pollutants that were stirred up during the
cleanup of the site.101 Neighbors of the Arsenal brought suit against Shell and the
United States for the combined role in causing noxious fumes and airborne hazardous
substances to be stirred up.102
Among other claims, the plaintiffs sought the establishment of a judiciallyadministered medical monitoring fund, to be funded by the defendants.103 They
asserted that the fund was necessary “to assist plaintiffs . . . in the prevention or early
detection and treatment of chronic disease.”104 This was the first time a United States
court of appeals was faced with this question, and the Tenth Circuit followed a
familiar line of reasoning to reach its holding.105 First, the court reminded us all of
the confusing mess that is CERCLA.106 Because Congress did not clearly define
“necessary costs of response,” the court was required to look at the other parts of the
statute and case law from district courts in determining whether the term included
the type of relief sought by plaintiffs.107 Next, the court established the chain of
definitional interpretation necessary to lay some form of foundation for its
analysis.108 While addressing the plaintiffs’ contentions that the definitions of
“removal” and “remedial” include language on monitoring and the “public health

96. E.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 1989); accord. Woodman v.
United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (“Rather than add unnecessarily to the length of
this Order, the Court adopts that portion of [Coburn] which discusses CERCLA response costs.”).
97. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Rachel E. Salcido, The Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge: On a Rocky
Road to Creating a Community Asset, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1401 (2014).
101. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532.
102. Id. at 1530, 1532.
103. Id. at 1532–33.
104. Id. at 1533.
105. See id.
106. Id. (“In keeping with its notorious lack of clarity . . . .”)
107. Id. at 1533-34
108. Id. (“A ‘response’ is a ‘removal action’ or a ‘remedial action.’” The Court then provided the
definitions of “removal action” and “remedial action.”).
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and welfare,” the court posited that the Brewer court applied too broad of a definition
to these concepts.109
Dismissing the Brewer analysis as overly-broad, the court next looked at
the analysis used by the court in Coburn.110 Ultimately finding Coburn more
persuasive, the court began its analysis with a close look at the definitions and
purposes of “removal action” and “public health and welfare.”111 According to the
court, the language within the definition of “removal action,” as well as the definition
of “remedial action,” clearly shows that Congress contemplated preventing or
mitigating releases of toxic or hazardous substances into the environment.112
Expecting this line of thought, plaintiffs argued that the definition of “removal
action” contained a second clause which should be read broadly to include liability
for any kind of monitoring.113 The contested clause said that the term “removal
action” would also include “other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize,
or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare.”114 Once again the court relied
on the limited interpretations of CERCLA which had held that removal and remedial
actions meant only those actions directed at preventing or mitigating the spread of
substances in the environment.115 Once again referring to Senator Randolph’s now
infamous phrase in the legislative history, the court held that medical monitoring
“smacks of a cause of action for damages,” and the legislative history clearly shows
that Congress had “deleted the Federal cause of action for medical expenses.”116
Finally, the court relied on the creation of the ATSDR as one last reason to grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for medical monitoring.117
This case rounds up all of the reasons to deny medical monitoring claims
under CERCLA and presents them is a neat, succinct opinion. Removal and remedial
actions are those actions which address substances in the environment, not in
humans.118 Congress chose to remove the individual cause of action for medical
expenses in its eleventh hour CERCLA compromise bill.119 The creation of and
authority vested within the ATSDR provide a route to remedy for these plaintiffs and
show that Congress contemplated medical monitoring under CERCLA and placed it
within the scope of responsibilities of the ATSDR rather than in Section 107
liability.120
109. Id. at 1535.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (2012).
115. Daigle 972 F.2d at 1535. CERCLA defines “environment” in two ways: “(A) the navigable
waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under
the exclusive management authority of the United States under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, and (B) any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply,
land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the
United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (2012) (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 1535–36.
117. Id. at 1536–37.
118. See id. at 1535.
119. Id. at 1536.
120. Id. at 1536.
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Daigle proved persuasive to the Ninth Circuit two years later, when that
court similarly held that medical monitoring costs are not response costs under
CERCLA.121 The next year, using its holding in Price, the Ninth Circuit determined
that CERCLA’s Section 113(h) jurisdictional bar122 did not apply to plaintiffs
seeking medical monitoring recovery through state tort law because medical
monitoring costs are not response costs.123 This provides an interesting avenue for
plaintiffs to seek recovery for medical monitoring from potentially responsible
parties. Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, this avenue is cluttered with
various obstacles and roadblocks making recovery in many states essentially
unreachable.124
E.

Does the ATSDR Provide the Kind of Care Exposure Victims Need?
i.

Hanford Downwinders Coalition v. Dowdle

This appeal of the lower court’s dismissal asked the Ninth Circuit to
consider whether CERCLA’s 113(h) jurisdictional bar applied to cases brought
against the ATSDR seeking injunctive relief in the form of a medical monitoring
program.125 The ATSDR had been conducting medical and health studies of the
communities near the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state since 1989,
investing over $23 million in studies to reach a conclusion in 1993 that the Hanford
site was “among the Superfund sites posing the most serious threat to public health
in the country.”126 Despite this finding and multiple public hearings on the potential
need for medical monitoring, no program had been set up when plaintiffs filed suit
in 1993.127 The defendants claimed, and the district court agreed, that the ATSDR’s
actions in conducting these studies constituted removal or remedial activity, and
therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction through CERCLA’s 113(h)
Timing of Review jurisdictional bar.128
This case diverges from the jurisprudence surrounding the definition of
“removal action” by finding that the ATSDR’s health assessment actions around
Hanford do fit within the definition.129 Despite the Chaplin, Coburn, and Daigle line
of cases holding that Congress only contemplated preventing or mitigating damage
to the environment in defining removal and remedial actions,130 this court held that
health assessments and surveillance of the communities near the Hanford site

121. Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012) (“No Federal court shall have jurisdiction . . . to review any
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title. . . . “).
123. Durfey v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121, 125–26 (9th Cir. 1995).
124. See infra Part V.
125. See generally Hanford Downwinders Coal, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. at 1472.
127. See id. at 1472–73.
128. Id. at 1473.
129. Id. at 1477.
130. See generally Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992); Coburn v. Sun
Chemical Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 9, 1988); Chaplin
v. Exxon Co., No. H-84-2524, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24438 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1986).
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constituted removal actions.131 While this case could have been a good sign to
prospective plaintiffs wanting to bring medical monitoring claims, it ultimately just
blocked another avenue to relief. Because the ATSDR actions are considered
removal actions, they fit squarely into Section 113(h)’s jurisdictional bar, stripping
any court of jurisdiction until the ATSDR has completed its activities.132 As Dowdle
and the next case show, it is incredibly difficult to show that the ATSDR has
completed its removal activities once the agency has begun its medical assessments
and surveillance. These processes take years, and the activities are not completed
even upon reaching the conclusion that medical monitoring should occur.133
Apparently, health screenings and medical monitoring programs are only considered
removal actions when the ATSDR is involved, not when plaintiffs bring suit against
the responsible parties seeking these programs as relief.
ii.

Pritikin v. United States Department of Energy

This case closed another door for CERCLA medical monitoring through
citizen suits.134 In the wake of widespread exposure from the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation, the ATSDR determined that a medical monitoring program was
necessary.135 Although the ATSDR was created specifically to provide such medical
monitoring, it ultimately failed to secure funding.136 Disappointed by this delay, a
member of the affected communities turned to the courts, seeking to compel DOE
funding for a medical monitoring program.137
The plaintiff in this case brought a citizen suit against the DOE and the
ATSDR, seeking declaratory relief and an order compelling the agencies to fund a
medical monitoring program.138 Citing the decision in Durfey, which relied on the
decision in Daigle, that “necessary costs of response” do not include medical
monitoring, the court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
CERCLA does not include a private cause of action to fund an ATSDR medical
monitoring program.139 CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(D) allows only ATSDR to
recover costs of medical monitoring from potentially responsible parties, according
to the court.140 This may be a correct reading of the statute, but it is also a clear
example of the lack of control and influence victims have in asserting their right to
medical monitoring after being exposed to toxic or hazardous substances. Victims
must rely on the ATSDR to make a determination, then wait for the ATSDR to
implement some form of medical monitoring program, and then hope that they do
not get sick and die before funding for that program runs out.
The costs of a medical monitoring program are not recoverable by direct
lawsuits because the ATSDR is charged with making medical necessity
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Dowdle, 71 F.3d at 1477.
Id. at 1479.
See infra notes 134–146.
Pritikin v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
Id. at 1226
Id. at 1227
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id. at 1227, 1228 n.4.
Id. at 1231.
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determinations.141 Even when involved in the cleanup process, the ATSDR can take
at least two years to make its determination.142 Even after making a determination
that a medical monitoring program should be implemented at a cleanup site, only the
ATSDR can seek cost recovery to fund the program.143 There might be the possibility
to bring suit against the ATSDR for failing to perform nondiscretionary duties
through a reading of Section 104(i)(9),144 but this option seems foreclosed by
numerous holdings that the ATSDR’s actions constitute response costs subject to the
Section 113(h) jurisdictional bar.145 The current balance of CERCLA case law is that
medical monitoring is not a response cost unless the ATSDR has taken it on.146 This
interpretation of Section 107 abandons the plain reading approach to statutory
interpretation since courts have arrived at different conclusions on the scope of
“necessary costs of response” while considering the same goal—medical
monitoring.147 These inconsistent conclusions mean that private individuals or
community-based coalitions cannot receive compensation for medical monitoring
while the federal government can. The silver lining here is that this contradiction left
the door open for recovery under state common law.148
V. STATE LAW APPROACH TO MEDICAL MONITORING
Some plaintiffs, either simultaneously to or in lieu of CERCLA action, have
brought actions in state court under common law tort. These actions assert that the
injury suffered by plaintiffs is the present need to undergo medical monitoring
outside the normal scope of medical care.149 Unlike most traditional torts, plaintiffs
assert an injury absent a present physical manifestation of that injury. Because of this
nuance in what most commentators have deemed “toxic torts,” courts have struggled
to find an equitable solution that provides justice for both innocent victims of toxic
substance exposure and the parties potentially responsible for the contamination.150
In 2005, only thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and Guam recognized medical

141. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1536-37 (10th Cir. 1992);
142. Pritikin, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
143. Id. at 1231.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(9) (2012).
145. See Hanford Downwinders Coal, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995); Envtl. Waste
Control, Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D.Ga. 1991).
146. See Reese & Wright, supra note 34 at 118–19.
147. Compare Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding medical
monitoring is not a necessary cost of response) with Dowdle, 71 F.3d at 14809 (holding medical
monitoring, when conducted or required by the ATSDR, is a necessary cost of response).
148. See Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“[Section 113(h)]
does not bar the plaintiffs’ state law claims because plaintiffs seek medical monitoring and medical
monitoring does not qualify as ‘removal or remedial action.’”).
149. Philip Desai, Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.: The Best Approach to Satisfying the Injury
Requirement in Medical Monitoring Claims, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 95, 102 (2011).
150. See Kristin Bohlken, Fitting the Square Peg of Alternative Toxic Tort Remedies into the Round
Hole of Traditional Tort Law, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 263 (1996); Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State
and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1989); Allan T. Slagel, Medical Surveillance Damages:
A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849 (1987).
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monitoring absent a present physical injury,151 compared with sixteen states and the
Virgin Islands that had explicitly rejected a claim for medical monitoring,152 four
states that had not articulated a test,153 and eighteen states that had not been faced
with the question.154 Some states have gone as far as creating their own miniCERCLAs.155
A number of states, mostly through state court jurisprudence, have accepted
medical monitoring within the realm of common law torts.156 These states either
recognize medical monitoring as a separate cause of action or as an element of
damages in a more traditional tort action.157 There are numerous public policy
151. D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095,
1114–15 (2006).
152. Id. at 1115–16.
153. Id. at 1116.
154. Id. at 1116–17.
155. See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 36-2805 (2010); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25300-395;
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-303, -304, 25-15-213, -214 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-126 (West
2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.141, .161, .725, .726, 208.001-.005 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 128-68, -81 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 ½ § 1022.2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3431(w), -3444
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.876, .877 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:11459 (West 2018);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 38 §§ 1319-B to -K (2018); MD. HEALTH & ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-218 to 221, -265 (2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21C, § 7, ch. 21E, §§ 1-13 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§
324.11101-11153 (LexisNexis 2018); MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.02 to .34 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1753 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 260.435, .437, .440 to .550 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 444.740, .742, .744,
.752, .774 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:1 to :11 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to
.11z (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4-7, -8 (2018); N.Y. FIN. LAW § 97-b (2018); N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0901, -0916, -0923, -1301 to -1319; 71-2723, -2725l; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§
1389-a to -d (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-166.18(a)(6), .19A (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3734.13 to .28 (2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-2015 to -2021 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§
459.590 to .600, .680, .685 (2018); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101-6020.1305 (West
2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-160 to -200 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-6308(c)(6) (2018); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.302 to .307 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1263(a), 1265(a), (d)(5), (e),
1282, 1283 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-178(A)(11-15), (B), 32.1-182 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.105D.010-70.105D.921 (LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.441 (West 2018).
156. See Aberson, supra note 151, at 1114–1116.
157. See, e.g., Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(applying the law of the District of Columbia to determine that the district would recognize a separate
cause of action for medical monitoring); Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D.Conn. 2002)
(applying Connecticut law to determine that plaintiff’s medical monitoring claims should survive
summary judgment if “other actionable injuries exist”); Patton v. General Signal Corp., 984 F. Supp. 666
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing a claim for medical monitoring as an element of consequential damage);
Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (applying Ohio law to determine that medical monitoring
is an element of damages once liability has been established under a different cause of action); Cook v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512 (D.Colo. 1991) (applying Colorado state law to determine that the
Colorado Supreme Court would recognize a medical monitoring cause of action); Burns v. Jaquays
Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (medical surveillance damages are recoverable under a
nuisance suit); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993) (allowing recovery of
damages for medical monitoring under traditional common law theories of recovery); Petito v. A.H.
Robbins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (under certain prescribed circumstances Florida
recognizes a cause of action for future expenses of medical diagnosis); Lamping v. American Home
Products, 2000 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2580 (4th D. Mont. Feb. 2, 2000) (adopting the reasoning in Petito to
hold that Montana recognizes a separate cause of action for medical monitoring); Ayers v. Twp. of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (recognizing medical surveillance as a compensable item of damages);
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reasons on both sides of this issue,158 but these states have elected to find preemptive
protection of innocent victims of contamination as more persuasive than economic
protection of the contaminators. In arriving at this conclusion, many courts struggled
with a number of complex and well-entrenched tenets of tort law. Courts have had
to grapple with the single controversy rule,159 the statute of limitations,160 and the
avoidable consequences doctrine.161 By allowing claimants exemptions to the single
controversy rule, courts avoided foreclosing a plaintiff’s ability to bring a future suit
for medical costs of treating a disease once it has manifested, even after being
awarded medical monitoring in the present.162 With the statute of limitations only
beginning to run upon a plaintiff’s discovery that they are at a greater risk of disease,
courts refused to let polluters avoid liability simply by keeping quiet about
contamination.163 This tolling of the statute of limitations also promotes good
corporate citizenship by encouraging polluters to be proactive in their cleanup
efforts. Finally, the recognition that the doctrine of avoidable consequences would
require plaintiffs to get medical monitoring in order to preserve full recovery of
medical expenses if a disease manifests, created a persuasive theory in support of
medical monitoring cost recovery.164
Pursuant to the single controversy doctrine, “a plaintiff or defendant who
does not assert all claims or defenses related to the controversy in a legal
proceeding[,] is not entitled to assert those claims or defenses in a later

Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997) (recognizing separate cause of
action for medical monitoring); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993)
(recognizing medical monitoring as an element of damages); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522
S.E.2d 424 (W.Va. 1999) (recognizing separate cause of action for medical monitoring).
158. Compare Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“First, there is an important
public health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic
chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease, particularly in light of the value of early diagnosis and
treatment for many cancer patients. Second, there is a deterrence value in recognizing medical surveillance
claims . . . Third, ‘the availability of a substantial remedy before consequences of the plaintiffs’ exposure
are manifest may also have the beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious future illness and thus
reduce the overall costs to the responsible parties.’ Finally, societal notions of fairness and elementary
justice are better served by allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs. That is, it would be inequitable
for an individual wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxins, but unable to prove that cancer or disease is
likely, to have to pay the expense of medical monitoring when such intervention is clearly reasonable and
necessary.” (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993))), with Arvin
Maskin, Konrad L. Cailteux & Joanne M. McLaren, Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving
Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 527–31
(2000).
159. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300–01; Burns, 752 P.2d at 31 (citing Ayers). This is sometimes referred to as
the “entire-controversy doctrine,” but the cases cited refer to it as the single controversy doctrine.
160. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 297–01; Burns, 752 P.2d at 31 (citing Ayers).
161. Hansen, 858 P.2d at 976; Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986).
This is sometimes referred to as the “mitigation-of-damages doctrine,” but the cases cited refer to it as the
avoidable consequences doctrine.
162. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300–301; Burns, 752 P.2d at 31 (citing Ayers).
163. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299–300 (New Jersey has a discovery rule which dictates that a cause of action
does not accrue “until the victim is aware of the injury or disease and of the facts indicating that a third
party is or may be responsible); Burns, 752 P.2d at 31 (citing Ayers).
164. Hansen, 858 P.2d at 976; Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319.
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proceeding.”165 In the realm of medical monitoring jurisprudence, this doctrine
would force plaintiffs to choose whether they want to gamble on a medical
monitoring claim or wait for a disease to manifest and then try to recover medical
expenses from the responsible parties.166 As the court in Ayers pointed out, however,
this doctrine should not affect this type of litigation because “the second cause of
action does not accrue until the disease is manifested; hence, it could not have been
joined with the earlier claims.”167
The avoidable consequences doctrine “induc[es] a plaintiff, after an injury
or breach of contract, to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the effects of the injury
or breach.”168 In recognizing medical monitoring as an element of damages, the
Hansen court reasoned that the avoidable consequences doctrine would require
plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of medical monitoring if and until their disease
manifested.169 The court recognized “the potential injustice of forcing an
economically disadvantaged person to pay for expensive diagnostic examinations
necessitated by another’s negligence.”170 As discussed below, this finding does not
mean an open season on medical monitoring claims because the court still required
the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant was negligent.171
A.

Friends for All Children

Cited in many cases, Friends for All Children was one of the earliest cases
considering the question of medical monitoring. This case was brought on behalf of
a number of Vietnamese orphans, arising out of an airplane malfunction as the United
States was exiting South Vietnam.172 About fifteen minutes after the plane took off
during “Operation Babylift,” a locking system on the airplane failed and the cabin
pressure dropped precipitously.173 As a result of this depressurization, the airplane
needed to attempt a crash landing, killing almost all of the passengers in the cargo
compartment and several in the troop compartment.174 This specific decision is but
one of many in the “protracted litigation arising out of” this disaster.175
As a result of the depressurization, many survivors of the plane crash
suffered from Minimal Brain Dysfunction (MBD), and it was alleged that they were

165. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (10th ed. 2014) (directed to “entire-controversy doctrine” at
649).
166. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300 (“[t]he doctrine may bar recovery where, as here, suit is instituted to
recover damages to compensate for the immediate consequences of toxic pollution, but the initiation of
additional litigation depends upon when, if ever, physical injuries threated by the pollution are
manifested.”).
167. Id.
168. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (10th ed. 2014) (directed to “mitigation-of-damages doctrine”
at 1154).
169. Hansen, 858 P.2d at 976.
170. Id.
171. See infra Section V(C).
172. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
173. Id. The court called the drop in pressure “explosive.”
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 838–39 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(complete provision of the facts of this disaster).
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at risk of developing neurological disorders in the future.176 The court’s approach to
determining liability, specifically as it concerned these future neurological disorders,
has become a reliable source of persuasive authority for many plaintiffs. In 1984,
there was no clear guidance for how a court, much less a federal court applying state
law, should calculate damages for a plaintiff in this situation. Absent present physical
injury, plaintiffs generally may not receive redress––and might not even have
standing––for common law torts.177 In this case, the MBD was a cognizable injury
that could fit the mold of a traditional action for negligence, but the plaintiffs wanted
something more: diagnostic testing.178
The question of whether diagnostic testing was recoverable was one of “two
principal issues before” the court in this case.179 The defendant’s argued that the
District of Columbia tort law would not recognize this cause of action,180 and that
case law from other jurisdictions did “not encompass an action for being put ‘at
risk.’”181 The court disagreed.182 In holding that a cause of action exists for diagnostic
testing, the court sought to serve two principles: (1) “deterrence of misconduct” and;
(2) “just compensation to victims of wrongdoing.”183 The court then introduced a
hypothetical situation to illustrate its position on this issue:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding through a red
light. Jones lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters
a hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine
whether he has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove negative, but
Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic
examinations.184
This hypothetical poses two issues, despite being used by numerous courts
to find for plaintiffs along similar lines.185 First, Jones hits his head in the

176. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 819; Schneider, 658 F.2d at 838.
177. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979).
178. See Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 818–19.
179. Id. at 819.
180. Id. at 824.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 824–25. (“In light of general principles of tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
the law of other jurisdictions, we believe that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would recognize
such a cause of action.”)
183. Id. at 825.
184. Id.
185. E.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 251, 268 (D.Mass. 2014) (quoting
Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825); Allgood v. GMC, No. 1:02-cv-1077-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43693, at *16 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 12 2005) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825);
Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 880 (S.D.Ohio 1994) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825);
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D.Colo. 1991) (quoting Friends for All Children,
746 F.2d at 825); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823-24 n.26 (Cal. 1993) (quoting
Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825); Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 716 So.
2d 355, 359 (La. 1998) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford,
40 A.3d 514, 553-54 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 433 A.3d 105 (Md. 2013); Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287, 309 (N.J. 1987)
(quoting Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 825); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970,
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hypothetical “with some force,” which would likely leave at least some kind of
physical evidence of an injury. Plaintiffs seeking medical monitoring for toxic
substance exposure would find it incredibly difficult to demonstrate the need for
diagnostic/medical testing since they would not have a similar gash or bump on the
head.186 While this hypothetical is convincing when faced with the question of
recovery for diagnostic testing, its utility may be limited to cases with a similar fact
pattern.
Second, Jones has already received diagnostic treatment and seeks to
recover the costs already incurred. This hypothetical carries the presumption that
plaintiffs will be in the position to afford this kind of diagnostic testing.
Unfortunately, the foundation of America’s toxic legacy is built on environmental
racism and socioeconomic elitism.187 It is important to note that from the beginning
of medical monitoring common law recovery, there has been an implicit assumption
that plaintiffs could pay for the monitoring, but they should not have to if they can
prove a negligence case.
Despite these criticisms, Friends for All Children fundamentally changed
the way courts define “injury” in cases like this. Rather than there being the
identifiable, neck-brace-requiring injury we all read about in cases like Palsgraff, the
injury in some cases of toxic exposure is the need to receive medical care one would
otherwise not need.188 But for a defendant’s negligence, there would be no need for
diagnostic examinations to determine the extent of brain damage. This
reinterpretation became useful for courts trying to find equitable solutions when the
only identifiable injury was the increased presence of a substance in a human body.
In these cases, some detailed below, the injury is not the disease which may develop
but the introduction of foreign, most likely harmful, substances caused by another’s
negligence or intent.
Friends for All Children also proves problematic because of its discussion
of “increased risk.”189 The court determined that a cause of action existed for the
plaintiffs to recover the costs of diagnostic testing, while distinguishing a cause of
action for increased risk.190 Claims for medical monitoring mean seeking the costs
of periodic medical testing, as prescribed by a qualified physician, which have been
977-78 (Utah 1993) (quoting Friends for All Childen, 746 F.2d at 825); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999) (quoting Friends for All Children, 756 F.2d at 825).
186. See Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949 (2001); Gary E.
Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS 67 (2000).
Dr. Marchant posits the potential utility of toxicogenomics in showing observable effects of toxic
substances at the cellular level. This technology is as yet inadmissible at trial but could serve a very
important purpose in the future of toxic torts.
187. See EILEEN MCGURTY, TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTALISM: WARREN COUNTY, PCBS, AND
THE ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 130–41 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2009).
188. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 825. (“[T]he District Court correctly concluded that the
crash proximately caused the need for a comprehensive diagnostic examination. The court found that no
diagnostic examinations would be necessary ‘but for the fact that these children endured explosive
decompression and hypoxia aboard a plane which subsequently crashed, and that after the crash they
received relatively cursory, unspecialized examinations from the Air Force without any systematic followup by either defendants.’”).
189. Id. at 826. This discussion has simultaneously caused courts to both accept and reject medical
monitoring claims, depending on the interpretation.
190. Id.
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prescribed as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In contrast, an increased risk claim
is similar to a claim for future pain and suffering. The argument, essentially, is that
but for defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would not suffer emotional distress from
the possibility of developing a serious disease in the future. Many courts have
rejected a claim of this type.191
The defendants in Friends for All Children referred to a case that rejected a
claim for increased risk as persuasive authority to reject a claim for diagnostic
testing, but the court distinguished the claims.192 In doing so, the court drew an
incredibly fine line between the two claims. It referred to a claim for increased risk
as “too speculative,” while finding a claim for diagnostic testing as fully cognizable
based on “competent medical testimony.”193 This distinction is complicated,
however. The court reached what was ultimately an equitable decision–Lockheed
needed to fund diagnostic testing for the plaintiffs affected by Lockheed’s
negligence.194 However, in distinguishing the enhanced risk case, the court left open
certain questions about how far diagnostic testing or medical monitoring claims
could go. Despite its Jones hypothetical and its use to show that recovery should be
allowed despite lack of a physical injury, the court later said that “[i]n the absence
of physical symptoms, emotional distress caused by potential risk may also be
thought too speculative to support recovery.”195 This physical injury versus physical
symptoms question is not easily answered, especially when dealing with mass
exposure to a toxic or hazardous substance.
B.

Ayers

The Jackson Township Landfill Superfund site in New Jersey was listed on
the National Priorities List in December, 1982,196 after discovery that poor waste
management had contaminated 130 wells in the community.197 Between 1972 and
1980, the township dumped millions of gallons of human waste into the landfill it
operated.198 As a result of mismanagement, the wells in the vicinity of this landfill
were contaminated with volatile organic compounds (VOCs).199 Three hundred and
thirty-nine residents of Jackson Township brought suit against the municipality for
a variety of claims, despite a lack of present physical manifestation of their
191. See Aberson, supra note 151, at 1115–16.
192. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 826 (citing Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713,
716 n.2 (N.D.Ill. 1978)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 2, FOURTH FIVE-YEAR REVIEW REPORT
JACKSON TOWNSHIP LANDFILL SUPERFUND SITE, JACKSON TOWNSHIP, OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY, at
2, 14 tbl.1 (2015).
197. U.S Envtl. Prot. Agency, SUPERFUND SITE: JACKSON TOWNSHIP LANDFILL JACKSON TOWNSHIP,
NJ,
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=second.Cleanup&id=0200549#bk
ground (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
198. U.S Envtl. Prot. Agency, Background, SUPERFUND SITE: JACKSON TOWNSHIP LANDFILL
JACKSON TOWNSHIP, NJ, https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0200549 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2018).
199. Id.
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injuries.200 At the outset of the pertinent section of its analysis, the court phrased the
question before it succinctly: “at what stage in the evolution of a toxic injury should
tort law intercede by requiring the responsible party to pay damages?”201
While opponents of medical monitoring claims may view this kind of
opinion as judicial activism,202 the court recognized the lack of administrative or
statutory remedies available to the victims of toxic exposures.203 In reaching its
conclusion that New Jersey would recognize medical monitoring as an element of
damages, the court established crucial precedent. Not only did the court recognize
the need for judicial action on this issue, but it raised and dismissed a number of
procedural hurdles along the way.204 The court first addressed the issue of the state’s
statute of limitations,205 then the single controversy rule,206 and finally the difficulty
of proving causation.207
New Jersey’s statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two
years.208 “The single controversy rule ‘[mandates] that a party include in the action
all related claims against an adversary and its failure to do so precludes the
maintenance of a second action.’”209 Diseases caused by toxic substance exposure
often have long latency periods between exposure and manifestation of disease.210
This latency period risked spoiling future claims due to both the statute of limitations
and the single controversy rule, but the court took an equitable common sense
approach to solving these issues.211 New Jersey’s discovery rule dictated that a cause
of action did not actually “accrue until the victim is aware of the injury or disease
and of the facts indicating that a third party is or may be responsible.”212 Implicitly,

200. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 298 (N.J. 1987).
201. Id.
202. See generally William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A
Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Jeffrey
Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the
Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (1983); David I. W. Hamer, Medical Monitoring in North
America: Does This Horse Have Legs, 77 DEF. COUNSEL J. 50 (2010); Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber
& Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349 (2005).
203. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299 (Discussing the failings of the Superfund Study Group, “[w]ithout a
comprehensive governmental response to the problem of compensating victims of toxic exposure, the
only available remedy lies within the legal system.”).
204. Id. at 299–303. Besides the critical procedural obstacles discussed below, the Court also raised
but did not discuss: “ . . . the identification of the parties responsible for the environmental damage; the
risk that responsible parties are judgment-proof; the expense of compensating expert witnesses in
specialized fields such as toxicology and epidemiology; and the strong temptation for premature
settlement because of the cost and complexity of protracted multi-party litigation.” (citing Ginsberg &
Weiss, supra note 202, at 924–28).
205. Id. at 299–300.
206. Id. at 300.
207. Id. at 301–03.
208. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2(a) (West 2004).
209. Ayers, 225 A.2d at 300 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 556–57
(1981)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 70 (1981)).
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the court defined “injury” broadly to ultimately find an injury for the mere exposure,
and distinguish that injury from a later manifestation of disease.213 The court
similarly reasoned its way around the single controversy rule.214
The problem with causation proved a more difficult dilemma, but the court
nonetheless found an interesting way to provide an equitable solution for all sides.215
The court began by acknowledging that a main cause of the causation dilemma is the
lack of an “A strikes B” causal connection.216 Because of the pathways of exposure,
background levels of hazardous substances, and latency of the diseases, it is often
incredibly difficult to show that a specific party caused a plaintiff’s exposure.217
While the court recognized this dilemma and ultimately overcame it, it did so by
citing to the “Jones hypothetical.”218 The Jones hypothetical contains a definitive “A
strikes B” fact pattern, but the court relied on it to reach its holding that medical
monitoring is an element of damages. This has not caused issues with courts relying
on the Ayers decision, but is important to point out because it shows the inherent
complexity of medical monitoring jurisprudence.
C.

Hansen

Another common realm for medical monitoring claims is within asbestos
litigation. This claim for medical monitoring was brought by plaintiffs after being
exposed to asbestos while doing renovation work in Utah.219 The court below granted
summary judgment to defendants because “no bodily injury has been manifested in
any plaintiff.”220 The Utah Supreme Court, using the decisions in Friends and Ayers,
reversed the trial court and established medical monitoring as a recoverable element
of damages in the state of Utah.221
This case is very much the culmination of medical monitoring jurisprudence
and provides the clearest analysis used to reach a holding that plaintiffs should be
able to recover medical monitoring costs.222 The plaintiffs’ contentions boiled down
to “but for their exposure to asbestos, they would not be obligated to incur [the]
additional medical expenses.”223 The court addressed this question from the

213. Id. at 304 (“The invasion for which redress is sought is the fact that plaintiffs have been advised
to spend money for medical tests, a cost they would not have incurred absent their exposure to toxic
chemicals.”).
214. Id. at 300 (“[T]he single controversy rule . . . cannot sensibly be applied to a toxic-tort claim filed
when disease is manifested years after the exposure, merely because the same plaintiff sued previously to
recover for property damage or other injuries.”).
215. Id. at 300–03, 309–15.
216. Id. at 301–02 (citing Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D.Utah 1984)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 309–10 (citing Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
219. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1993).
220. Id. at 981 (internal quotations omitted).
221. Id. at 979.
222. Id. at 975–82. A specific claim was brought for medical monitoring as a result of exposure, the
court analyzed the arguments for and against, including the avoidable consequences doctrine, and the
court determined that it would be more equitable to allow recovery.
223. Id. at 976.
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perspective of public policy–identifying key underlying principles first–and then
weighed the fairness to both parties of a medical monitoring cause of action.224
The Utah Supreme Court first explained that the avoidable consequences
doctrine and the general rule allowing recovery of future medical costs weigh in
favor of a medical monitoring cause of action, because to find otherwise would force
“an economically disadvantaged person to pay for expensive diagnostic
examinations necessitated by another’s negligence.”225 Picking up the thread from
Friends, the court then stated that the injury in a toxic tort case is the “exposure itself
and the concomitant need for medical testing.”226 Finally, quoting the Jones
hypothetical from Friends, the court held that a cause of action for medical
monitoring exists in Utah.227 Unlike the decision in Ayers, the Hansen decision
recognized the nuanced nature of physical impact and physical injury and addressed
the dilemma by citing a decision from California.228 In Miranda v. Shell Oil, the
California Court of Appeals bridged the gap between the Jones hypothetical and
toxic tort cases by stating that “[t]he outcome should be the same when the operative
incident is toxic exposure rather than collision and the potential future harm is
disease rather than physical impairment.”229 This might seem straightforward, but up
to this point no court had made a clear statement addressing the lack of a physical
impact on toxic tort plaintiffs. The bridge created by Miranda and adopted by
Hansen made the Jones hypothetical applicable to toxic substance exposure victims.
Despite recognizing a medical monitoring cause of action, the Utah
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court.230 The court created a “Utah
Test for Recovery of Medical Monitoring Damages” by cobbling together standards
stated in Ayers and Merry v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.231 Understandably, the
plaintiffs had not made sufficient allegations to meet the newly created test.232 This
remand is yet another example of how complex the issue of fairness can be for courts
deciding medical monitoring cases. It would have been unjust to preclude plaintiffs’
medical monitoring claim because they failed to meet an unheard-of test, but it would
have been similarly unfair for the Utah Supreme Court to play the role of fact finder.
In walking the fine line of equity, the court sent the case back to the trial court to
allow all parties the time and opportunity to conduct proper discovery and allege
sufficient facts to make a factual determination on the medical monitoring claim.233
224. Id. at 976–78.
225. Id. at 976.
226. Id. at 977.
227. Id. at 978.
228. Id. at 977 (citing Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
229. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1651, 1657 (1993)).
230. Hansen, 858 P.2d at 981–82.
231. Id. at 979 (citing Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Merry v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D.Pa. 1988)).
232. Id. at 981–82.
233. Id. “[W]e think that in light of the unsettled state of the law on medical monitoring in Utah, the
only fair course is to remand this matter to permit plaintiffs to attempt to meet the newly articulated
standard. This is especially so since plaintiffs claimed in their final motion before the trial court that
discovery was incomplete and represented to the court that further medical consultation was anticipated.
If, after a fair opportunity, plaintiffs cannot satisfy the standard we articulate today, their claim should
fail.”
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Petito

This case dealt with the physical injury versus physical symptom dilemma,
head on.234 A case of first impression for the Florida court, this cased asked “whether
or not Florida recognizes a cause of action for medical monitoring when the party
seeking relief has yet to develop any identifiable physical injuries or symptoms.”235
This case also introduces a different nuance into this article, the class action
lawsuit.236 Pursuing recovery as a class spreads the costs of litigation across many
potential claimants, making these claims easier to file and litigate. Medical
monitoring claims require numerous experts to prove exposure, toxicity, medical
implications, likelihood of disease, rate of success of the treatment regime, all on top
of the costs of litigating a basic negligence claim.237 This case is not directly
analogous to the medical monitoring cases that came later, but it established
important precedent in Florida and has been relied upon by courts in other
jurisdictions.238
The focus of this case was the use of the diet drugs Fenfluramine and
Phentermine,239 colloquially known as “fen-phen.”240 Fen-phen was discovered to
cause heart valve damage in patients, and the class in this case was made up of
plaintiffs who had taken the diet drugs but did not currently exhibit any physical
manifestations of cardiac issues.241 Plaintiffs alleged that ingestion of these drugs
“placed them at a substantially increased risk of developing serious cardiac and
circulatory ailments.”242 Plaintiffs requested an injunction requiring the defendants
to “fund a court supervised medical monitoring program” which would provide a
number of treatments necessary to diagnose cardiac issues earlier than otherwise
discovered.243
In the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, it contended that
a cause of action cannot exist when plaintiffs have not actually suffered any injury.244
Relying on the hypothetical from the Friends for All Children opinion, the court
disagreed with the defendant’s argument.245 The court drew an important line
between absence of a physical injury and absence of any injury, building upon the
Friends analysis in an effort to redefine injury in a way to provide an equitable

234. Petito v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 So.2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
235. Id. at 104.
236. Id.
237. See infra Section V(E).
238. See, e.g., Lamping v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 2000 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2580, at *14 (Mont. 4th
Dist. Ct. Feb. 21, 2000) (directly adopting the Petito test).
239. Id.
240. David J. Morrow, Fen-Phen Maker to Pay Billions In Settlement of Diet-Injury Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/08/business/fen-phen-maker-to-pay-billions-insettlement-of-diet-injury-cases.html. Between 1996 and October 1999, around “6,500 lawsuits
encompassing 11,000 people” were filed.
241. Petito, 750 So.2d at 104.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 105.
244. Id.
245. Id. The Court directly quoted the hypothetical.
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solution to a difficult problem.246 This broadening of “injury” allows recovery for
medical monitoring, but it is again premised upon an identifiable incident.247 The
fen-phen diet pills were prescribed to these patients whereas many people exposed
to toxic or hazardous substances have little way to know about the exposure as it is
happening. The length of time between toxic exposure and knowledge can be
decades, making it more difficult to point to an identifiable incident directly causing
the need for medical monitoring. These issues permeate throughout medical
monitoring claims, but courts have had an easier time finding an injury in cases
where the initial exposure is clearly identifiable and easily tied to a defendant.
Finally, and as mentioned earlier, the Petito decision addressed how to best
redress plaintiffs in these cases.248 Among courts that have recognized medical
monitoring either as a cause of action or as an element of damages, they face the
question of lump sum monitoring damages or a judicially administered monitoring
fund. Defendants at all stages of these cases argue that it would not be fair to require
them to give money to plaintiffs with no identifiable physical injuries. This argument
is compelling enough for many courts to grant motions to dismiss at early stages of
the litigation.249 Even when courts recognize medical monitoring, as the Petito court
did, the fairness argument becomes compelling in determining the amount and form
of damages.250 The fairness argument goes against lump sum payments because
plaintiffs could take the money and never receive the medical monitoring for which
the money was intended.251 The Petito court foresaw this predicament and proposed
a judicially administered fund rather than a lump sum award.252 The court left the
specific requirements and processes of these funds up to the trial courts to establish
on a case-by-case basis, but did propose minimum guidelines.253 This judicially
246. Id. (“Although it is true that plaintiffs in cases such as these have yet to suffer physical injuries,
it is not accurate to say that no injury has arisen at all.”).
247. While this case is quite different from the other hazardous or toxic substance exposure cases
discussed in this article, it is critical to the development of medical monitoring recovery case law as the
issue before the Court was “whether or not Florida recognizes a cause of action for medical monitoring
when the party seeking relief has yet to develop any identifiable physical injuries or symptoms.” Id. at
104, 108.
248. Id. at 108.
249. See Aberson, supra note 151, at 1115–16 (charting seventeen states that do not allow medical
monitoring absent a present physical injury).
250. Petito, 750 So.2d at 105 (“[W]e do not think that Plaintiffs should be able to recover lump sum
damages in anticipation of future diagnostic expenses.”).
251. Jesse R. Lee, Medical Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the Administration of Medical
Monitoring Programs, 20 AM. J. L. & M. 251, 268 (1994).
252. Petito, 750 So.2d at 105.
253. Id. at 107 (“1. Appoint a plan administrator. 2. With the administrator’s advice, approve an
advisory panel of persons qualified and knowledgeable in the field to do the following: a) establish a plan
where only persons who consumed the medication, or in appropriate cases were exposed to the hazardous
substance, may participate; b) establish the minimal area(s) of diagnostic tests or procedures to be
performed (including the number as well as the duration of the procedures); c) select a list of highly
knowledgeable, skilled, competent, and neutral and detached examining physicians to perform the tests,
both for the metropolitan areas as well as the regional areas throughout the state. 3. Establish a notification
process generally sufficient to bring the opportunity for monitoring to the attention of persons who have
used the medication. 4. Establish a time frame for those eligible to obtain the monitoring. 5. Implement
procedures whereby the monitoring physicians submit their reports and findings, together with the
statement of their charges, directly to the plan administrator who shall promptly pay the reasonable
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administered fund avoids fairness dilemmas moving forward because it ensures
plaintiffs indeed receive the medical monitoring for which they originally brought
suit.
E.

The Test and Limits

The cases discussed above are not the complete jurisprudence of medical
monitoring claims,254 but their well-reasoned analyses make this complex realm
easily understandable. The Friends court created a new cause of action for a tort
claim without the manifestation of a present physical injury,255 but this was
fundamentally limited to cases in which there had been an identifiable physical
impact. The Ayers court applied—albeit imperfectly—the Jones hypothetical to a
case where the physical impact was much more attenuated, and deftly analyzed its
way around significant procedural hurdles.256 The Hansen court clearly bridged the
gap between physical impact and toxic substance exposure by adopting the Miranda
analogy.257 Finally, the Petito court put all of these pieces in place and provided an
example of a beginning-to-end analysis, not only finding a cause of action for
medical monitoring but also prescribing the remedy.258 The Friends and Ayers
decisions are valuable for the foundation they established and the public policy
arguments contained within the opinions.259 The Hansen and Petito decisions—
along with a number of similar decisions260—are valuable for the clarity of the tests
created for medical monitoring claims.261 With very little variance, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2) to a proven
hazardous substance; (3) caused by the defendant’s negligence; (4) as a proximate
result of the exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of contracting a
serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early
detection of the disease possible; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different
from that normally recommended in the absence of the exposure; and (7) the
prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according to contemporary
scientific principles.”262

amount of their claims. The parties shall have full access to such reports and the reports will be made
public except for the names of the examinees, which shall remain confidential.”).
254. See supra note 151, at 1114–17 and accompanying text.
255. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825–26. (“[T]he District
Court correctly concluded that the crash proximately caused the need for a comprehensive diagnostic
examination.”).
256. See supra notes 194–216 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 217–231 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 232–251 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Friends, 746 F.2d at 824–26; Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311–13 (N.J.
1987).
260. See supra note 157.
261. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979–81 (Utah 1993); Petito v. A.H. Robins
Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
262. Petito, 750 So. 2d at 106–07. But see Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (Creating an additional requirement
that “early detection is beneficial, meaning that a treatment exists that can alter the course of the illness.”
See also Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 360–61 (La. 1998); Bower v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432–33 (W. Va. 1999).
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The tests constructed by courts in these cases are not without their limits,
however, and the most familiar limit is one on recovery. A minority of courts have
awarded lump sum damages to plaintiffs that can successfully bring a claim for
medical monitoring.263 The vast majority have opted for a judicially administered
monitoring fund to limit recovery to monitoring that is actually received. A federal
district court in Ohio, in deciding that Ohio state law would recognize a claim for
medical monitoring, further limited recovery to monitoring “directed toward the
disease for which the tort victim is at risk,” as “established by the evidence and
determined by the jury.”264 Building a convincing case for medical monitoring is
incredibly difficult, expensive, and time consuming.265
VI. BROADENING THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
A.

Amend CERCLA

Proving a toxic torts case for medical monitoring recovery is a difficult task.
The costs are high, and the burdens of proving causation are nearly insurmountable
because of the latency element.266 CERCLA, on the other hand, places the burden on
PRPs to show that they are not liable for damages. The strict, retroactive, and joint
and several liability schemes built into CERCLA would ease much of the burden on
toxic exposure victims. There are inherent fairness concerns with placing the burden
on PRPs, and those concerns will be addressed, but ultimately, the fairness concerns
with placing the burden on innocent victims should carry the day.
The demands of a medical monitoring claim since first introduced in
Friends have increased in light of the stringent standards set out in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.267 These obstacles have made the state common law
route basically untenable for most people exposed to hazardous or toxic substances.
Congress could address the toxic legacy of our country, and the racial and
socioeconomic inequalities inherently built into it, 268 by amending CERCLA.
The structure of the law has led courts to conclude that when a victim seeks
additional medical monitoring these costs are not necessary costs of response.
However, when the ATSDR concludes that medical monitoring is necessary, but has
not yet funded the regime, plaintiffs cannot seek an injunction to receive medical
monitoring sooner because of Section 113(h)’s jurisdictional bar. This conclusion
means, necessarily, that when the ATSDR is pursuing a medical monitoring regime,

263. Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Metro-North
Commuter R.R., v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 432–33 (1997) (surveying minority approach).
264. Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
265. See generally Adam P. Joffe, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a
Proposed Solution, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663 (2009).
266. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2005).
267. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591–95 (1993) (including whether the theory
or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community).
See also Lin, supra note 266 at 1451.
268. See MCGURTY, supra note 187.
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the costs of medical monitoring are necessary costs of response. This logical
incongruity serves as an effective bar to recovery for plaintiffs seeking medical
monitoring funding but can be easily addressed. If medical monitoring costs are not
necessary costs of response, then Section 113(h)’s jurisdictional bar should not be
applied. If, on the other hand, they are necessary costs of response, then they should
be necessary costs of response for plaintiffs as well as the ATSDR. This logical
congruity would need to be established through judicial action, and it seems unlikely
that courts would part with decades of jurisprudence on the subject.
The amendment proposed here would not fundamentally change the nature
of the law, nor would it add new liabilities on PRPs. By moving Section 104(i)—
authorizing the ATSDR to initiate community health studies and medical monitoring
funds269—into Section 107(a), the presumption would be that medical monitoring
costs are “necessary costs of response.”270 This solution could also be done by
providing a definition of “necessary costs of response,” clarifying that the term does
encompass medical monitoring costs.
Legislative action, even with Congressional gridlock, is the most likely
avenue to address these issues within CERCLA. Undoubtedly, any possible
Congressional action would be met with stout opposition. CERCLA’s liability
structure places much of the burden on PRPs, and the addition of medical monitoring
costs would be seen as an additional liability. This is not the case. PRPs are already
liable for medical monitoring costs, if the ATSDR finds that medical monitoring is
necessary. The administrative barriers and bureaucratic red tape around the
ATSDR’s functions, however, have made it effectively a bar to recovery and medical
monitoring for plaintiffs. Moving the health surveys and medical monitoring sections
of CERCLA into Section 107 would shift the burden onto PRPs to show why they
should not pay the costs. This solution would address many of the obstacles faced by
toxic substance exposure victims, namely reducing the costs of litigation and getting
them the medical monitoring they need much quicker.
B.

A Risk-Based Administrative System

This alternative is simultaneously the least likely in this current political
climate, and the least attractive. Through the implementation of a tax or sliding-scale
internalized cost system, polluters would pay into a fund used to compensate victims
of toxic substance exposure.271 Functioning similarly to a workers’ compensation or
social security fund, polluters would pay into this fund based on the amount they
pollute or are likely to pollute.272 The proposal removes the hurdle of specific
causation, and creates an administratively monitored fund made available to people
exposed to a set list of substances.273 If, for example, Mr. Jones were exposed to
Listed Substance A, he would be able to make an administrative claim for money to

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2012).
See Lin, supra note 266, at 1486–87.
Id. at 1486–88.
Id. at 1488–90.
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fund the medical treatment necessary for exposure to Listed Substance A.274 If,
however, Mr. Jones were also exposed to an unlisted substance, he would need to
seek damages through the traditional tort route described above.275 This solution is
logical on paper, but would likely not address the immediate needs of the
communities already suffering from toxic substance exposure, and would certainly
not address those needs quickly.
This proposal would potentially normalize harmful business and waste
management practices. Landfill operators will have already paid to pollute the soil,
water, and air, so what would compel them not to? While internalizing the costs of
contamination makes sense, especially when they are currently externalized and
placed onto the shoulders of victims, this proposal may go too far. There is already
a government agency tasked with providing medical monitoring funds, and the
ATSDR takes years to develop the research necessary to make a finding and even
longer to actually implement a program, if it ever does. There is no guarantee built
into this proposal that victims would ever actually receive support in paying for a
medical monitoring regime. Finally, it would likely take a number of years and
countless federal funds to develop the list of substances to be included in this riskbased scheme. As the list is built, more communities would be exposed to toxic
substances and communities already dealing with the mental and physical anguish
of exposure would need to continue to wait. This solution only serves to limit the
liability on industry and does not address the broader issues of America’s toxic
legacy or the continued environmental injustice276 served upon communities of color
and impoverished communities through shady industrial siting and zoning.
C.

State Legislative Affirmance of the Medical Monitoring Cause of Action

With Congressional gridlock, and the decades of jurisprudence in the way,
communities facing issues with toxic and hazardous substance exposure should
continue to focus on state-based solutions. Whether those solutions are achieved
through state legislatures or courts, the trend has been for states to adopt medical
monitoring into their common law systems.277 This trend will likely continue and
medical monitoring will be adopted, particularly in those states where the question
has not been addressed.
i.

Akins/Petito/Paoli Tests

The Petito court provided the clearest, most succinct test for determining
whether medical monitoring is warranted.278 Other courts have produced similar, and
just as useful tests in this field. These tests should be used by state courts to address
claims for medical monitoring as they consider all sides of the fairness arguments.

274. Id. at 1488 (“For example, if an oil refinery’s sulfur dioxide emissions were expected to cause
fifty additional cases of lung disease and ten additional deaths per year, the refinery would make a payment
to the administrative system reflecting the costs of those injuries.”).
275. Id.
276. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL 20-YEAR
RETROSPECTIVE REPORT (1994–2014) 56 (2016).
277. See supra Part V.
278. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

90

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 49; No. 1

An element sometimes included in medical monitoring tests is a requirement that a
treatment exist for the disease.279 This element feels heartless but is ultimately
reasonable. If there is no treatment for a specific disease caused by a toxic substance,
then there would be no cost recovery for medical treatment associated with that
disease.280 It would be ultimately unfair for defendants to pay for medical monitoring
when there would be no benefit wrought from early diagnosis of a disease.
Courts have gone to considerable lengths to craft these tests in a way that is
equitable to both parties, but only in terms of the ultimate result. These tests, along
with the myriad hurdles detailed above, ultimately limit the number of plaintiffs that
bring claims for medical monitoring. Without Congressional action on CERCLA,
this is unfortunately the system most plaintiffs are going to have to deal with if they
wish to receive medical monitoring. There is, however, another route that some states
have elected to use.281 States have a law that functions similarly to CERCLA, and
they have used these laws to spearhead clean up at sites that are not on the National
Priorities List.282 The focus of most state programs is on economic development,
often referred to as a “brownfields program.”283 These programs allow re-use of
contaminated sites, as well as preservation of untouched, natural land.284
ii.

Joffe’s Test

Ultimately incredibly helpful, the Jones hypothetical introduced by the
Friends court created an implicit bias against medical monitoring claims without a
cognizable physical impact. This bias was overcome by the Petito and Hansen
courts, to an extent, but those courts still relied on the cognizable event that led to an
increased risk of developing a disease.285 What these cases have failed to do is grant
recovery in the form of medical monitoring when the plaintiff struggles to point to
an identifiable event, when the contamination is old and wide-spread and the
consumption of or interaction with the substance has taken place over long periods
of time. These cases have failed to address an issue substantially similar to the issue
faced by the victims of the Wolverine contamination.
Even well-intentioned commenters on this subject have fallen into the trap
of cognizable events as a prerequisite to recovery.286 The most recent articulation of
279. See supra Part V; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990).
280. With many hazardous or toxic substances linked to myriad diseases, this element would likely be
implicated quite rarely. For example, if substance X could only be reliably linked to disease Y and disease
Y had no current medical treatment, then there would be no cost recovery for medical monitoring to detect
disease Y. However, if substance X could be reliably linked to diseases Y, Z, and Q, and diseases Z and
Q had current medical treatments then there could be cost recovery for medical monitoring to detect those
diseases. This element of the test would also be implicated if the medical monitoring for disease Y were
only utilized to detect disease Y. In that case, there would be no cost recovery for that medical monitoring.
281. See supra note 155.
282. ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 2001
UPDATE 7 (2002).
283. Id. at 7–9.
284. RES., CMTY, AND ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-99-39,
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: STATE CLEANUP PRACTICES 5 (1998) (referring to these untouched lands as
“greenfields”).
285. See supra Sections V(C)–(D).
286. Joffe, supra note 265, at 682.
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a medical monitoring test, published in 2009, required a “specific and traumatic
occurrence.”287 This presumes a fact pattern more similar to Jones at the red light
than to the Michiganders around the Wolverine waste site. There is not necessarily a
specific and traumatic occurrence for this community; they have been forced to
unwittingly suffer countless specific and traumatic occurrences as a result of
Wolverine’s negligence.
Whether achieved through state legislative or judicial action, any test for
medical monitoring needs to be constructed with an eye towards the kind of issues
that have arisen as a result of America’s toxic legacy. The Jones hypothetical is no
longer applicable when the contamination is wide spread and occurs over a long
period of time. The reliance on a “specific and traumatic occurrence” leaves people
like those of this Michigan community without a real avenue to recovery. There are
complications in creating the ideal test, one that would accommodate victims of
latent toxic substance exposure just as well as it would accommodate victims of a
one-time massive exposure.
The ideal approach may not be a traditional “test,” as that phrase is
understood and used in tort law. Taking the test provided by Mr. Joffe in his article,
and replacing or supplementing the first requirement—a specific and traumatic
occurrence—with a set of factors used to determine the factuality, seriousness, and
likelihood of disease resulting from toxic exposure would address the inherent gaps
in the tests currently used.288 One such set of factors was provided by the Supreme
Court of California as it upheld that medical monitoring is a compensable item of
damages.289 The factors are:
(1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals; (2)
the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease
in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the
plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b)
the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4) the
seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value
of early detection and diagnosis.290
This revised and broadened standard291 would benefit a greater number of
people and allow for improved public health results. If there is a clear and specific
event that has caused a plaintiff to be at an increased risk of disease, the standard
would allow for recovery assuming the other factors can be proved by a
287. Id. (“[A] defendant should be liable to provide medical monitoring expenses when: (1) the
potential injury results from a specific and traumatic occurrence; (2) scientific evidence suggests that the
defendant’s tortious conduct . . . results in a statistically significant increase in likelihood that the plaintiff
will develop a specific illness; (3) early detection of the specific illness is possible and can lead to the
prevention of death or debilitation; (4) causation can be shown such that the plaintiff would not reasonably
require a specific medical examination but for the defendant’s tortious conduct; and (5) the benefits of
medical monitoring outweigh the costs.”).
288. Id.
289. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824–25 (Cal. 1993).
290. Id.
291. Joffe’s test could be revised to say: “(1) the potential injury results from a significant exposure
to toxic chemicals.” This would in no way undermine the original test’s emphasis of a specific and
traumatic occurrence but would broaden the scope to include those plaintiffs who may have been exposed
over time.

92

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 49; No. 1

preponderance of the evidence. If, however, as so often happens in cases of latent
exposure and contamination, it is impossible to identify one singular event, this
standard would still allow recovery–again, assuming all other factors can be proved.
This solution is not ideal, but it is the change most likely to be seen in the
foreseeable future. Intransigence in Congress and a general distaste for the
“regulatory state” make any positive changes to federal or state laws unlikely. Courts
can find justice for these plaintiffs by recognizing medical monitoring as either a
stand-alone cause of action or as a compensable item of damages. Allowing more
communities an avenue to receive the kind of medical care they need as a result of
toxic or hazardous substance exposure will lead to positive public health outcomes
and will begin to address the rampant environmental injustices heaved upon
communities of color and impoverished communities.292
VII. CONCLUSION
There are no efficient, effective, or realistically accessible solutions for
impoverished communities to receive medical monitoring after being exposed to
toxic or hazardous substances. There is no longer a question about CERCLA liability
for medical monitoring costs. Even if a state has recognized medical monitoring as
a cause of action or an element of damages, the costs of litigation are going to
preclude the most vulnerable communities from advocating for their health. Finally,
very few states have created a state-based mini-CERCLA that goes far enough
beyond the federal CERCLA to include medical monitoring as a cost of response.
While it is in no stretch of the imagination an easy feat, the most complete
solution to these problems is amending CERCLA. Forcing plaintiffs to shoulder the
burden of medical monitoring costs up front and the costs of litigation is unjust.
Allowing clearly liable responsible parties to avoid paying the costs of medical
monitoring is equally unjust. CERCLA’s strength lies in its broad polluter pays
principle which forces PRPs to come to the table and either pay their fair share or
prove that they were not responsible. This principle needs to be broadened to cover
medical monitoring costs. Narrow interpretations of the statute and one unfortunately
uttered phrase in the legislative record have robbed these communities of the
opportunity to see crippling and fatal diseases coming.
The argument often levied against medical monitoring costs as necessary
costs of response is that PRPs will have to pay for medical monitoring of people that
will never get sick. This is true, there is no guarantee that toxic or hazardous waste
exposure will result in disease. However, what is also true is that but for the
negligent, reckless, or intentional actions of PRPs, these communities would not be
at a heightened risk of disease. Continuing to allow PRPs to avoid liability for
medical monitoring costs results in providing them an indirect economic benefit for
their bad actions. Because our environmental laws are founded on the basis of
protecting the human health and welfare, we must do more. No polluting company
should be allowed to benefit economically even if it means paying for, perhaps,
unnecessary medical monitoring.

292. See MCGURTY, supra note 187.

